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OVERLAPPING REMEDIES AND THE 
UNEXPECTED TERMINATION 
OF OIL AND GAS LEASES* 
[reprint, first published 2011] 
DAVID R PERCY, QC & DAVID MCGILLIVRAY** 
The freehold oil and gas lease in Canada has had a perilous and 
uncertain existence. In the early cases, the courts applied a literal 
interpretation of the leases, resulting in numerous unexpectedly terminated 
leases. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of cases involving 
terminated leases. Modern case law recognizes that the failure of a lease 
can create liabilities in both tort and restitution, but courts have faced 
difficulties in dealing with the overlapping compensatory and restitutionary 
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remedies. The modern case law has been heavily criticized, but the authors 
argue that there is a smaller difference between the overlapping remedies 
than is commonly supposed when the underlying purpose of restitutionary 
remedies is examined, and they propose a resolution to the problem of 
overlapping remedies. 
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I. Introduction 
The freehold oil and gas lease in Canada has had a perilous and uncertain 
existence. Cases going back as far as the early 1960s have demonstrated the 
ease with which the freehold lease may come to a sudden and unexpected 
end. There have been two distinct phases in the development of the 
jurisprudence over this time. The first phase of cases involving failed leases 
spanned the decade that stretched from 1961 to 1971. The cases were 
marked by a “determinedly literalist application” of the words of the lease, 
often by the Supreme Court of Canada, in a manner which “frequently 
astounded those who originally prepared the document.”1 Although a 
member of the Supreme Court of Canada, in one case of literal 
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of Toronto Press, 2008) at 109–10. 
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interpretation, observed that he was not satisfied that “the result accords 
with the intention of the parties to the instrument,”2 this approach left the 
legal landscape littered with unexpectedly terminated leases. The cases in 
the first phase of Canadian law were also notable for devoting very little 
attention to the remedial consequences of unexpected failure. 
After 1971, there was a period of relative quiescence when few cases 
involving challenges to leases reached the courts. It appeared that most of 
the obvious causes of failure had been covered by improvements in 
drafting, so that new leases were not often the subject of litigation. 
However, the oil and gas lease can be long-lived, and many of the older 
leases continued in existence with hidden pitfalls that would only be 
exposed in the event of a challenge. 
There has been a resurgence in cases of lease failure in the past decade. 
Anecdotally it has been suggested that a rash of new actions have mounted 
challenges against existing leases but they have not yet reached the courts. 
This second phase of Canadian case law is no longer marked by a tendency 
towards literal interpretation, but it has exposed new areas in which leases 
can be vulnerable. In addition, the modern case law has placed an intense 
focus on the remedies available to both parties following the failure of 
lease. 
The purpose of this article is primarily to deal with the remedial 
consequences of the failure of leases where the production of petroleum or 
natural gas has occurred after the termination of the lease. It will focus on 
four major issues: 
(1) A comparison of the different approaches to remedies in the first 
and second phases of Canadian case law; 
(2) The recognition in recent cases that the failure of a lease can 
create liabilities in both tort and restitution, and the difficulties 
that courts have experienced in dealing with the overlap between 
these areas of law and their respective approaches to the 
assessment of damages; 
(3) An examination of the severe criticism of decisions in recent 
cases that awarded a compensatory remedy in tort where leases 
have failed and that dismissed remedies in restitution on the 
grounds that they would create a windfall to the lessor; 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Shell Oil Co v Gibbard, [1961] SCR 725 at 732, Locke J [Gibbard]. 
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(4) A resolution of the important issue of how restitution and 
tortious remedies relate to each other, and the quantification of 
damages under each approach. 
In order to provide some context for the discussion of remedies, we will 
briefly review in turn the six general areas which have proved vulnerable in 
freehold oil and gas leases. The first three areas of vulnerability were 
prominent in the first phase of the development of Canadian law, while 
recent cases have involved the last three areas. 
A. Failure to Drill or Pay Delay Rental 
Traditional oil and gas leases often contained a provision that provided 
for the automatic termination of the lease if the lessee did not commence 
operations for the drilling of a well within one year from the date of the 
lease. The requirement to drill a well could typically be deferred if the 
lessee paid the required delay rental on or before the anniversary date of the 
lease. Leases frequently failed because the lessee did not commence drilling 
operations and did not pay the delay rental in accordance with the 
requirements of the lease.3 
B. Operations at the End of the Primary Term 
The final year of the primary term of a lease is particularly hazardous for 
a lessee. The lessee no longer has the option of paying a delay rental at the 
end of the final year, and many leases only allowed the lease to be extended 
if the lessee achieved production before the end of the primary term. In the 
first phase of the development of Canadian law, three cases involved the 
production of oil and gas after the lease had terminated because the lessee 
failed to bring a well into production within the primary term. They resulted 
from the classic interpretation of a common variety of the freehold lease 
first adopted in the Canada-Cities Service Petroleum Corp v Kininmonth 
decision,4 in which termination occurred when the lessee commenced a 
well within the primary term but achieved production only after its expiry. 
The cases concluded that this type of lease expired at the end of the primary 
term unless a well was in production at that time. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 3. See e.g. East Crest Oil Co Ltd v Strohschein (1951), 4 WWR (NS) 70 (Alta SC 
(TD)), aff’d [1952] 2 DLR 432 (Alta SC (AD)). 
 4. [1964] SCR 439 [Kininmonth]. All three cases are discussed in the text at Part 
II.B.2. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/7
2017]        Overlapping Remedies 483 
 
 
C. The Pooling Clause 
In order to maximize the production of oil and gas, Alberta was quick to 
enact conservation legislation that limited the density of wells to one for 
each drilling spacing unit. The normal drilling spacing unit was set at a 
quarter section for an oil well and one section for a gas well. Energy 
companies with rights to tracts of land that were smaller than the required 
size began to include in their leases the right to pool the leased lands with 
other lands in order to achieve the rights to an entire drilling spacing unit. 
However, a series of cases emphasized that this alone was not enough to 
validate the individual leases of each tract within the unit. 
In Shell Oil Company v Gunderson,5 the lessee had leased a quarter 
section of land owned by Gunderson and pooled that land with a 
neighbouring quarter section, which it had also leased. The lessee drilled a 
successful gas well on the neighbouring lands and shut in production as it 
was entitled to under the terms of the lease. It then paid a shut-in royalty to 
the owner of the neighbouring land and to Gunderson and took the position 
that both leases remained in force throughout the period of deemed 
production. 
When Gunderson challenged the continuing validity of the lease, the 
Supreme Court of Canada noted that the habendum clause of the lease 
stated that it continued for so long “as the leased substances or any of them 
are produced from the said lands.”6 The Court interpreted the habendum 
literally and noted that under the terms of the lease, only the Gunderson 
lands were defined as “the said lands.” The Gunderson lease thus 
terminated because it could not be continued by deemed production that 
occurred on neighbouring lands rather than “the said lands.” 
D. The Shut-In Well Provision 
From the early days of the industry, lease forms have given the lessee the 
right to shut in a completed well for a variety of reasons. As long as the 
requirements for a shut-in well are met and a shut-in royalty is paid 
annually in accordance with the terms of the lease, the shut-in well is 
deemed to be a producing well for all the purposes of the lease. Although 
natural gas wells were frequently shut-in for long periods of time, it is only 
in the recent phase of Canadian case law that the shut-in well provision has 
proved to be fatal to a number of leases. Those cases have frequently found 
                                                                                                                 
 5. [1960] SCR 424 [Gunderson]. See also Canadian Superior Oil of California, Ltd v 
Kanstrup (1964), [1965] SCR 92. 
 6. Gunderson, ibid at 428 [emphasis added]. 
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that the lessee failed to meet the prerequisites for exercising the right to 
shut in a well. 
Freyberg v Fletcher Challenge Oil and Gas7 raises important remedial 
questions that are discussed in Part III of this article. There, the lease failed 
because of the lessee’s failure to meet the requirements of the shut-in well 
provision. The lease allowed a well to be shut-in where there was no 
production “as a result of the lack of an economical or profitable market.”8 
A well on Freyberg’s land was shut-in from 1978 until 1998. In 1998 
operations on Freyberg’s land were commenced and a well was brought to 
production in 1999. Although shut-in well payments had been made 
throughout the twenty-year period, the Alberta Court of Appeal found that 
the lessee had failed to demonstrate there was a lack of an economical or 
profitable market during the whole of that time. As the lessee had not 
established that there was no market for the gas until 1999, the shut-in 
royalty payments had not served to extend the life of the lease. In Durish v 
White Resource Management Ltd,9 the lease allowed a well to be shut-in, in 
accordance with “good oil field practice.”10 The lessee had arranged for 
Gulf Resources Company (Gulf) to drill a well under a farm-out agreement, 
but a dispute arose over the fees for the transmission and processing of gas 
charged by Gulf, and the well was shut-in. The Alberta Court of Appeal 
found that the decision to shut in the well because of a fee dispute had 
nothing to do with good oil field practice and, as a result, the lease had 
terminated. 
E. Production During the Extended Term of the Lease 
The freehold lease grants land to the lessee for the specified primary 
term and thereafter for an extended term, which can be defined in a variety 
of ways. In Montreal Trust Co v Williston Wildcatters,11 which will be 
discussed in detail in Part III of this article, the extended term allowed the 
lease to continue for so long as there was production or for so long as the 
lessee was engaged in or prosecuting “drilling or working operations”12 on 
                                                                                                                 
 7. 2005 ABCA 46, 363 AR 35, rev’g 2002 ABQB 692, 323 AR 45 [Freyberg]. 
 8. Ibid at para 28. 
 9. (1987), 82 AR 66 (QB), aff’d (1988), 63 Alta LR (2d) 265 (CA) [Durish]. For a 
further example of the failure of a lease as a result of the improper application of the shut-in 
well provision see 549767 Alberta Ltd v Teg Holdings Ltd (1997), 70 ACWS (3d) 355 (Alta 
QB). 
 10. Durish, ibid at para 3. 
 11. 2001 SKQB 360,108 ACWS (3d) 383 at para 50, aff’d 2002 SKCA 91, 223 Sask 
R276, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 29401 (30 September 2002) [Williston Wildcatters]. 
 12. Ibid at para 4. 
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the leased lands. The lease in that case was originally created in 1952. A 
successful oil well was drilled in 1955 and continued in production until 
1990. There was no production for a seven-month period in 1990, and 
during that period, the lessee conducted only two acts that could be 
classified as “working operations” under the extension clause. In the first 
round of litigation that dealt with the validity of the lease, the trial judge 
described these actions of the lessee as “isolated acts, widely spaced in time 
and pursued only briefly. They can best be described as minimal and 
futile.”13 The lease thus expired because after the lease had been extended 
by production, there was a period in which neither production nor 
operations were occurring. 
F. Failure to Respond to a Notice of Default 
Most modern leases guard against the possibility that a breach might 
automatically terminate a lease through the device of a default clause. The 
clause requires the lessor to provide a notice of breach and then stipulates a 
period of grace to enable the lessee to remedy the breach. The lease 
terminates only if the lessee fails to remedy the breach within the stipulated 
period. This eventuality arose in Canpar Holdings Ltd v Petrobank Energy 
and Resources Ltd,14 which will be discussed further in Part III of this 
article. The royalty clause in a petroleum and natural gas lease required the 
lessee to pay a royalty of 17.5 percent “of the greater of the actual price 
received . . . or the current market value at the time and place of sale of all 
these substances produced from the lands, all without any deductions.”15 
The ultimate lessee wrongly calculated royalty payments based on its 
corporate average or pooling price, and failed to pay any royalties on gas 
that it used as fuel for its compressors, both on and off the leased lands. The 
lessors gave notice of default under the terms of the lease, but the lessee 
ignored the notice, apparently confident of its interpretation of the royalty 
clause. The Court found that the lessee’s confidence was misplaced and that 
the lease terminated at the end of the period of grace. The Alberta Court of 
Appeal did not indicate any disagreement with this conclusion, but 
probably for the first time in Alberta, it granted relief against the forfeiture 
of an oil and gas lease.16 In Canpar Holdings, it reinstated the lease and 
required the lessor to pay royalties in accordance with its terms.17 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Ibid at para 50. 
 14. (9 October 2009), Calgary 0601-05052 (Alta QB) [Canpar Holdings trial]. 
 15. Ibid at 4. 
 16. See Nigel Bankes, “Court of Appeal grants relief from forfeiture in an oil and gas 
lease case” (24 February 2011), online: ABlawg.ca <http://ablawg.ca/2011/02/24/court-of-
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II. The First Phase of Lease Failure Cases 
An examination of the consequences of failed leases in the first phase of 
the development of Canadian law reveals one cardinal feature. These cases 
typically resulted in an order requiring the lessee to vacate the lands, with 
the comment that if this result appeared harsh, it was a consequence of strict 
compliance with the terms of the lease chosen by the lessee. With a single 
exception, none of the cases decided during this decade provided the lessee 
with any compensation for benefits that may have been conferred on the 
owner of the leased lands. Indeed, the cases contain no suggestion that the 
lessee could recover even payments of money, in the form of delay rentals 
or shut-in royalties, which had been made to the owner in the mistaken 
belief that the lease remained valid. 
The courts’ failure to consider the consequences of an unexpectedly 
terminated lease probably arose from two causes. First, Canadian courts 
began to develop common threads in the previously disparate categories of 
restitution only in the mid-1970s.18 Until that time, there had been little 
systematic analysis of the fate of benefits transferred under failed 
transactions. Secondly, the case reports suggest that counsel, in the first 
phase cases, framed their arguments in an attempt to avoid the termination 
of leases, particularly through the doctrine of estoppel, rather than 
attempting to mitigate the consequences of termination. The estoppel 
arguments were almost universally unsuccessful19 but appeared to deflect 
the courts from examining whether the lessee could recover the value of 
any benefits that had been transferred under the failed lease. 
In order to examine the approach of the courts in the first phase of 
Canadian case law, it is necessary initially to distinguish cases in which 
                                                                                                                 
appeal-grants-relief-from-forfeiture-in-an-oil-and-gas-lease-case/>. As Bankes points out, 
relief from forfeiture was available because this involved termination for cause, while most 
Canadian cases have involved leases that expressly terminated automatically, according to 
their own terms. 
 17. 2011 ABCA 62, 331 DLR (4th) 588 [Canpar Holdings]. 
 18. See e.g. Storthoaks (Rural Municipality of) v Mobil Oil Canada, Ltd (1975), [1976] 
2 SCR 147. See also Peter D Maddaugh & John D McCamus, The Law of Restitution, 2nd ed 
(Aurora, Ont: Canada Law Book, 2004) at 17–26. 
 19. The argument succeeded in the unique circumstances at Voyager Petroleums Ltd v 
Vanguard Petroleums Ltd (1982), 47 AR 14 (QB), aff’d (1983), 47 AR 1 (CA), leave to 
appeal to SCC refused, (1983), 50 AR 82n. For the general failure of estoppel arguments, 
see Ballem, supra note 1 at 402–23; Nigel Bankes, “Termination of an Oil and Gas Lease, 
Covenants as to Title, and Assessment of Damages for Wrongful Severance of Natural 
Resources: A Comment on Williston Wildcatters” (2005) 68:1 Sask L Rev 23 at 31–33 
[Bankes, “Termination”]. 
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there was no production of oil or gas from the failed lease from those which 
dealt with the proceeds of production that had been realized after the lease 
had terminated. 
A. Failed Leases Where No Production Occurred 
Some cases in this category did not create any controversy. There was no 
realistic possibility of the lessee obtaining any form of compensation where 
the lease expired without the lessee having conducted any significant 
activity on the lands. The classic example of these cases occurred where the 
lessee mistakenly thought that a well drilled on lands with which the 
originally leased lands had been pooled was sufficient to validate the 
original lease.20 In these cases, no lasting improvements were left on the 
lands subject to the original lease, and the lessee could not point to any 
justification for compensation for activities that they may have conducted 
on those lands. 
In contrast, significant problems arose where the lessee did create an 
improvement on the leased lands prior to termination. Typically, the 
improvement occurred where the lessee drilled a productive well on the 
leased lands only to discover that the lease had expired before the well 
could be brought into production. The most common cause of this situation 
occurred when the lessee decided that it was necessary to shut in a gas well 
but delayed the payment of the shut-in royalty until after the primary term 
had expired. These cases are a subgroup of those described in Part I.B of 
this article because the fatal gap between the capping of the well and the 
payment of the royalty meant that there was no actual or deemed production 
at the end of the primary term, resulting in the automatic termination of the 
lease.21  
A variation of this problem occurred in Republic Resources Ltd v 
Ballem,22 where the lessee commenced a gas well during the term of the 
lease and completed it one week after the end of the primary term. It paid a 
shut-in royalty almost immediately after the completion of the well, but the 
lease terminated because there was no form of production in place when the 
primary term ended. In another of the shut-in royalty cases, the Alberta 
Court of Appeal recognized that this created a draconian result. It 
commented that “[i]t may appear harsh that the [lessee’s] expenditure in 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See especially Gunderson, supra note 5. 
 21. See e.g. Canadian Superior Oil Ltd v Paddon-Hughes Development Co Ltd, [1970] 
SCR 932. 
 22. (1981), 33 AR 385 (QB) [Republic Resources]. See also the discussion of 
Kininmonth, supra note 4, in Part II.B.2 of this article. 
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drilling the well, as well as the benefit of the lease itself should be lost 
through a short delay in the payment of shut-in royalties,”23 but the Court 
felt that this result was dictated by the terms of the lease. Although the 
lessee in Republic Resources argued that the lessor was incontrovertibly 
benefitted by the presence of a completed well on her lands, the Court felt 
unable to award the lessee any compensation for the cost of drilling the 
well. One of the present authors has argued that these results are contrary to 
the modern law of unjust enrichment because they provide the lessor with 
an uncompensated benefit, in the form of the well. The enrichment of the 
lessor is not immediate but will be fully realized if and when the well is 
brought into production.24 However, none of the recent cases raise this issue 
and it will not be pursued further in this article. 
B. Failed Leases That Achieve Production 
Although there is a strong argument that the lessee should obtain a 
remedy in some cases where there has been no production under a failed 
lease, the argument is compelling where there has been actual production of 
petroleum or natural gas before the parties realize that the lease has failed. 
In these cases, the courts typically required the lessee to vacate the lands, 
with the result that the lessor received all the proceeds of future production. 
In addition, the lessor usually claimed all the proceeds of production from 
the date that the lease terminated, on the theory that after that time, the 
lessee had no right to the produced substances. However, the lessor was in 
the position of seeking all the benefits of the well and leaving the lessee to 
potentially bear all the costs only because of the lessee was mistaken as to 
its legal rights. These cases appeared in the first phase of the development 
of Canadian law and the courts approached the remedial problems that they 
raised as matters of first impression. However, before examining the 
Canadian authorities, it is important to note that at that stage the freehold 
lease in Canada still strongly resembled its American forbears. It is 
instructive to examine the approach taken by American courts to resolving 
the identical problems that arose under a very similar legal instrument, 
particularly because traces of the American approach are still found in 
recent Canadian cases. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 23. Canadian Superior Oil Ltd v Paddon-Hughes Development Co Ltd (1969), 3 DLR 
(3d) 10 at 19 (Alta SC (AD)). 
 24. David R Percy, “The Law of Restitution and the Unexpected Termination of 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Leases” (1988) 27:1 Alta L Rev 105. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/7
2017]        Overlapping Remedies 489 
 
 
1. American Cases on Failed Leases 
The similarity between original Canadian freehold petroleum leases and 
their American counterparts meant that the American leases often failed for 
the same reasons. At the time of the first phase of Canadian cases, the 
American courts had already developed a great deal of experience in 
resolving the problems that were only beginning to emerge in Canada. 
The American approach is simple in principle and is applied with 
considerable consistency. It is exemplified in the well-known case of 
Champlin Refining Co v Aladdin Petroleum Corp,25 in which Champlin 
Refining Co (Champlin) had purchased two leases from the state of 
Oklahoma, apparently without any warranty of title. It drilled two wells on 
the leased lands at a cost of more than $157,000 and produced oil and gas 
from those wells for a considerable period of time. Champlin then 
discovered that it had no right to the lands in question and surrendered the 
lease and the producing wells to the rightful owners. Champlin also paid the 
rightful owners an amount of more than $310,000, which represented the 
market value of all production taken from the wells, less the expenses of 
drilling, developing, and operating the wells (which totaled approximately 
$197,000). Still dissatisfied, the rightful owners brought action for the total 
value of all the oil and gas that Champlin had produced from the lands. The 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that Champlin was mistaken in its view 
of the true ownership of the land and that it had unquestionably acted in 
good faith, in the belief that its leases were valid, when it drilled the wells 
and brought them into production. The Court awarded damages for the 
petroleum and natural gas that Champlin had produced on the basis of the 
value of the oil at the time of production, less the reasonable costs of 
production. Champlin’s belief that it held all the required rights to the 
leased lands meant that it was a good faith trespasser, and it was only 
required to pay the net proceeds of production to the rightful owners. In 
contrast, if the Court had found that Champlin was a bad faith trespasser, it 
would have been required to disgorge all the proceeds of production from 
the lands in question. 
Two features of the American case law are notable in the light of 
developments in Canada. First, as the Champlin case illustrates, the good 
faith trespasser will recover the reasonable costs of producing petroleum 
substances from the leased lands, or their actual costs if they are lower than 
the reasonable costs. If an efficient trespasser succeeded in bringing a well 
                                                                                                                 
 25. 238 P.2d 827 (Okla. 1951) [Champlin]. 
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into production at a cost that was lower than the prevailing market rates, it 
would recover only its actual expenses. On the other hand, any unnecessary 
costs incurred by the trespasser will not be recovered. This distinction 
emphasizes that the purpose of allowing a mistaken producer to recover its 
costs is clearly to prevent what would otherwise have amounted to an unjust 
enrichment of the lawful owner at the expense of the trespasser.26 
Second, although most American cases have concluded that the 
trespasser acted in good faith,27 the threshold for finding that a trespass was 
committed in bad faith is not as high as the Canadian cases suggest. One of 
the most widely quoted definitions states: 
[T]he defendant must have an honest belief in the superiority of 
his right or title, and such belief must be a reasonable one in the 
light of the circumstances. The test is subjective in that he must 
have actual notice of the outstanding paramount right, and 
constructive notice is not sufficient. The test is objective in that 
he must not have acted with culpable negligence or with wilful 
disregard for the rights of others, and in that his belief in the 
superiority of his claim must be reasonable.28 
The application of this principle is less strict than the definition implies. 
Most states placed the onus of proving good faith on the trespasser. A 
number of jurisdictions have found that the company acts in bad faith if it 
chooses to drill a well with the knowledge that there is an actual or pending 
claim over the validity of its rights. This approach has been extended to 
cases in which a company proceeded to production after a decision that the 
competing claim was invalid, but before a final appeal was heard.29 There is 
little doubt that the facts in some of the recent Canadian cases suggest that 
an argument of bad faith trespass might have been open to the lessor.30 
  
                                                                                                                 
 26. John S Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell, 5th ed (St Paul, MN: Thomson 
Reuters, 2009) at 58. 
 27. Ibid. 
 28. Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas (Cincinnati: Anderson, 1987) 
vol 1 at 315–16 [footnotes omitted]. 
 29. Shell Oil Co v Manley Oil Corp, 50 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Ill. 1942). 
 30. See particularly Xerex Exploration Ltd v Petro-Canada, 2005 ABCA 224, 367 AR 
201 [Xerex], discussed in Part III.C of this article and the argument in Bankes, 
“Termination,” supra note 19 at 61–63. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/7
2017]        Overlapping Remedies 491 
 
 
2. The Approach of Canadian Courts in Phase One 
In the first phase of Canadian case law, three cases confronted the 
problem of accounting for the proceeds of production after the failure of a 
lease. None of the cases offer any analysis of the problem and the list of 
authorities cited suggests that the relevant arguments were not before the 
courts. The results of the cases can be placed on a spectrum. At one end, the 
court ignored the production that had occurred, and at the other, the court 
reached the conclusion that would have been appropriate only if the 
trespass had occurred in bad faith. In the middle of the spectrum, the only 
Supreme Court of Canada decision reached a result that is broadly 
consistent with the American cases of good faith trespass. 
All three cases in the first phase involved the problem identified in the 
Kininmonth decision, where the lessee commenced a well within the 
primary term but failed to achieve production prior to its expiry.31 The 
cases uniformly found that this type of lease expired at the end of the 
primary term unless a well was actually in production at that time.32 It is a 
rarely discussed feature of the Kininmonth case that it also raised the 
question of the fate of the proceeds of production under the invalid lease. In 
that case, the lessee had produced oil from the well for a period of 
approximately 11 days after the lease expired.33 The lessor sought only a 
declaration that the lease had terminated and was successful on this point. 
He made no claim to the proceeds of production. Probably for this reason, 
and because of the short duration of the production, the Court did not deal 
with the proceeds of production in its reasons for judgment. It may be 
presumed that they remained in the hands of the lessee. 
Paramount Petroleum and Mineral Corporation Ltd v Imperial Oil Ltd 
dealt with a problem that was identical to that which arose in Kininmonth, 
with the exception that the lessee continued the production of large volumes 
of oil for many years after the lease expired.34 The Court found that the 
lessee was unaware of the nature of its rights until long after it brought the 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Supra note 4. 
 32. This type of clause also explains the decision in Republic Resources, supra note 22 
(see Part II.A of this article). 
 33. Kininmonth, supra note 4 at 440. 
 34. (1970), 73 WWR 417 (Sask QB) at 425 [Paramount]: The lessee held two leases 
covering one and a half sections of land. The Court found that only the lease covering a half 
section of land was invalid. By the time of the trial, the decision indicates that the well on 
the land included in the terminated lease had been in production for nearly 11 years and that 
the lessee had paid almost $77,000 in royalties in respect of the entire one and a half 
sections. 
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well into production. There is thus no doubt that the lessee was, in 
American terminology, a good faith trespasser, but nevertheless, the Court 
ordered an accounting “with respect to all oil, gas and other mineral 
substances taken from the said lands,”35 just as if the lessee had been a bad 
faith trespasser. 
Long after the first phase of the development of Canadian law, the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal reached the same result as the Paramount 
decision in 1993. In Hill Estate v Chevron Standard Ltd,36 Chevron 
Standard Ltd (Chevron) entered into a mineral lease with the wife of the 
mineral owner, who was acting under a power of attorney granted by her 
husband in 1978. Some four years later, both the mineral owner and his 
wife had died and Chevron notified the owner’s estate that was about to 
commence drilling under its lease. The lawyer for the estate told Chevron 
that the power of attorney was invalid, because of the mental incapacity of 
the owner at the time it was granted, and that the lease was therefore void. 
Nevertheless, Chevron proceeded to drill a successful well and begin 
production. 
The case was unusual. The Court decided that the lease was invalid, but 
then invited further argument on the consequences of that decision.37 The 
Court recognized that Chevron’s actions in drilling the well had enriched 
the estate. However, it found that the estate was entitled to all the revenue 
generated by the sale of oil from the mineral estate, without any deduction 
for the costs of drilling or marketing the product. Under the traditional 
approach, this result could have been justified by classifying Chevron as a 
bad faith trespasser because of its decision to drill a well when it knew the 
lease might be void. However, the Court declined to pursue this reasoning 
and commented that equity would not “afford protection to a trespasser.”38 
In drilling a well without valid legal authority, Chevron had provided a 
juristic reason for the enrichment. 
It is difficult to justify the decision to award the estate all the proceeds of 
production on this basis. The result is contrary to a 1971 decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, described in the following paragraph, and 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Ibid at 434. John Ballem reported anecdotally that in the accounting that followed 
the decision in Paramount, the parties allowed the lessee to deduct the cost of drilling and 
completing the well. Supra note 1 at 386. 
 36. (1992), [1993] 2 WWR 545 (Man CA). 
 37. Ibid at 569. 
 38. Ibid at 561. The reference to equity is probably explained because Chevron argued 
the case for recovering its costs on the basis of a constructive trust. However, there appeared 
to be no need for a proprietary, rather than a personal remedy, in restitution. 
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proved to be completely inconsistent with the direction adopted by the 
courts in the following decade, as described in Part III of this article. 
Only the last of the first phase of Canadian cases gave an explicit 
indication that the lessee could retain some of the proceeds of production 
that had occurred after the lease was terminated. In Sohio Petroleum Co v 
Weyburn Security Co Ltd,39 Sohio Petroleum Co (Sohio) began production 
of oil some six weeks after the end of the lease and production continued 
for almost seven years before the lease was challenged. The lessor was 
successful in its action to require the lessee to vacate the land, but also 
sought an accounting for the value of all the oil produced from the leased 
lands. The accounting issue was dealt with only in the final substantive 
paragraph of the decision in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. It stated: 
The respondent also sought an accounting of all petroleum, 
natural gas and related hydrocarbons removed from the land by 
the appellants, or damages in lieu thereof. The court has 
jurisdiction to grant this relief on terms which will be just and 
equitable to all parties involved. The appellant Sohio proceeded 
under a mistake as to its rights, and did not knowingly take an 
unfair advantage of the respondent’s lack of appreciation of its 
legal rights. The appellants were first aware that their position 
was challenged when the writ of summons was served upon 
them. At that time the revenue which they had received from the 
sale of the production exceeded the amount they had expended. 
Under the circumstances, it would appear just and equitable to 
order the appellants to account for all benefits from production 
received by them after the date of service of the writ of summons 
upon them.40 
The case offers no explanation for this conclusion, other than the 
principle of justice and equity. As will be seen in the following section, 
recent case law has correctly identified this brief passage as central to 
Canadian law dealing with the proceeds of production. As a result, it has 
been subject to close scrutiny, but it has also been used to justify some 
surprising conclusions. It is therefore initially important to assess the 
probable meaning of the passage in the context of the Sohio decision. The 
statement is noteworthy in three respects. First, there is no indication that 
there was any significant argument on the question of whether the lessor 
                                                                                                                 
 39. [1971] SCR 81, aff’g (1969), 7 DLR (3d) 277 (Sask CA) [Sohio]. 
 40. Ibid at 89. 
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should receive the proceeds of production. The reasons for judgment at all 
three levels cite no relevant authority on this question, and they are 
concerned almost entirely with the termination of the lease and the defence 
of estoppel. Second, the paragraph clearly establishes that the lessee was an 
innocent trespasser. Third, when faced with the lessor’s claim to all the 
proceeds of production, the Court expresses a concern that Sohio should, at 
a minimum, recover its costs of production. Although the exhibits filed at 
trial in the Sohio case apparently contain details of Sohio’s production,41 
there is no indication that there was any detailed evidence on this point. The 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal appeared to allow Sohio to retain the 
revenue as of the commencement of the action as a rough and ready 
formula to ensure that it had covered its costs. 
It must be conceded that the meaning of the vital paragraph in the Sohio 
case is far from self-evident. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal recently 
asserted that this shows that the Court adopted a just and equitable approach 
to the assessment of damages.42 However, the simplest explanation of both 
the reasoning and the result may well be that the Court instinctively applied 
the good faith trespasser rule. It is quite possible that the reference to the 
“just and equitable” nature of the order merely reflects the recognition that 
it would be wrong to allow the lessor to recover all the proceeds of 
production without bearing any of the costs. There is some support for this 
interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada decision. Although the Court 
was content to reiterate the final paragraph of the judgment of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, set out above, unlike the Court of Appeal, it 
first noted that the lessor’s claim for an accounting of all production after 
the lease had terminated was “subject to an allowance for expenses incurred 
by the appellants.”43 The decision seems to adopt a formula which ensured 
that Sohio recovered its expenses of production. Admittedly, on this view, 
Sohio should not have been allowed to retain any amount in excess of its 
actual expenditures if the evidence permitted this calculation to be made. 
However, as a matter of principle, the Supreme Court decision suggests that 
the amount retained by the lessee should not be determined by broad 
principles of justice and equity, but by an examination of the extent to 
which the lessor would otherwise be enriched by the innocent, but 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See Montreal Trust Co v Williston Wildcatters Corp, 2004 SKCA 116, 254 Sask R 
38 at paras 96–99 [Williston Wildcatters (Remedies)]. 
 42. Ibid at para 96. 
 43. Sohio, supra note 39 at 89. Contrary to the assertion in Williston Wildcatters 
(Remedies), ibid, the reference to the lessor’s claim for the net proceeds of production did 
not appear in the Court of Appeal decision. 
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mistaken, actions of the lessee. The case can thus readily be seen as an 
application of the principle applied in Champlin, but without an exact 
assessment of the expenditures incurred by the lessee. 
III. Lease Failure in the New Millennium 
A. The Compensatory Approach 
The cases involving the unexpected termination of leases decided within 
the last decade take a radically different view of the position of the lessee. 
While the earlier cases, with the single exception of the Sohio decision, did 
not allow the lessee to obtain any compensation when a lease failed, the 
new wave of authority takes a markedly different approach. In each of the 
modern cases, the lessee was entitled to retain revenue from the failed lease 
at a level that could have considerably exceeded its costs of production. 
The point of departure of the recent cases arises in part from framing the 
claim to damages upon the failure of a lease in the law of torts, because the 
lessee commits trespass by remaining on the lands after the termination of 
the lease. Nigel Bankes has cast doubt on this analysis by pointing out that 
under a conventional lease, a tenant who continues in possession at the end 
of the term of the lease without the landlord’s dissent or assent does not 
commit trespass. He suggests that the proper cause of action in cases 
involving the oil and gas lease may lie in conversion.44 However, the 
Alberta Court of Appeal has correctly pointed out that there is a question of 
whether the holder of an interest in minerals has a sufficiently immediate 
right to the possession of substances not yet severed from the ground to 
support a conversion action.45 It is surely certain that an energy company 
which extracts resources from land owned by another person without a 
valid lease is violating a property right of that person. It is not necessary to 
resolve this debate for the purpose of contrasting the tortious approach to 
calculating damages, where the objective is placing the lessor in the 
position it would have occupied if the tort had not been committed, with the 
restitutionary approach of focusing on the extent to which the lessee has 
been enriched as a result of the wrong. However, it must be noted that the 
majority of Canadian cases treat the continued occupation of land after the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Bankes, “Termination,” supra note 19 at 52–55. Even though overholding tenants in 
a conventional lease may not commit trespass, they remain liable to a claim for the use and 
occupation of premises that is based on restitutionary principles as set out in Part IV.C of 
this article. See also Robert Megarry & William Wade, The Law of Real Property, 7th ed 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) at 773. 
 45. Xerex, supra note 30 at 243–44. 
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termination of a mineral lease as trespass, and it is not obvious why the 
approach that courts have taken in the case of conventional leases should be 
extended to the profit à prendre created by a mineral lease. 
The compensatory approach was initially developed by the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and subsequently embraced by the Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench in two of the leading cases of the past decade. In 
each case, the litigation was protracted and involved numerous judicial 
decisions. In Williston Wildcatters,46 which was described in Part I.E of this 
article, the lease failed in 1990 because, after 35 years of production, there 
was an extended period during which neither production nor operations 
occurred on the leased lands. The lessee continued to conduct activities on 
the leased lands without realizing that the lease had terminated, and 
ultimately brought the well back into production. In 1993 the lessor 
commenced an action in which it successfully challenged the validity of the 
lease and sought to recover the market value of all the oil taken from the 
leased lands after the lease had terminated. 
The dispute in Freyberg also involved separate hearings on the validity 
of the lease and the remedies available to the lessor. Although the Alberta 
Court of Appeal found that the lessee’s decision in 1978 to shut in the well 
was initially valid, it concluded that at some point before 1999 an economic 
market for gas existed and the lease had lapsed at that time.47 However, in 
1999 neither party was aware that the lease had terminated. The lessee 
brought the well into production in December 1999, and production 
continued until February 2006.48 In the hearing that dealt with the remedies 
in this case, the lessor sought to recover the gain that the lessee had 
received during the entire period of production, in an amount exceeding 
$4.8 million.49 
Both cases recognized that there were two possible approaches to 
compensating the lessor. The Courts described the restitutionary approach 
as resting on the theory that “a wrongdoer should not profit from his 
wrong” by removing “any benefit or gain from the hands of the defendant 
wrongdoer.”50 They treated the measurement of the actual recovery from 
the wrongdoer in restitution through a variation of the formula that 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Supra note 11 at paras 14–22. 
 47. Supra note 7 at para 137. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on the 
termination issue was refused (2005), 363 AR 35. 
 48. Freyberg v Fletcher Challenge Oil and Gas Inc, 2007 ABQB 353, 428 AR 102 at 
para 11 [Freyberg (Remedies)]. 
 49. Ibid at para 92. 
 50. Ibid at para 98. 
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examines the state of mind of the trespasser. In the case of bad faith 
trespass, the lessor will receive the value of the oil or gas, with a deduction 
only for the costs of transporting the substances to market. In the case of 
innocent trespass, the wrongdoer is entitled to deduct the costs of 
“severance, production and marketing.”51 
Both cases refused to apply either version of the so-called restitutionary 
approach. Instead, they adopted a tortious measure of compensation with 
the objective of placing the lessor in the position it would have occupied if 
the wrong had not occurred.52 On the facts of each case, the Courts felt that 
the innocent trespass rule would have overcompensated the lessor through 
an award that exceeded the amount which could ever have been received 
from the exploitation of the minerals. 
The possibility of overcompensation arose from the nature of each lessor. 
In Williston Wildcatters, Montreal Trust Company (Montreal Trust) held 
the lease as a bare trustee. Under the terms of the trust agreement, it had no 
right to produce oil and gas from the leased lands, and if it had known that 
the lease had lapsed, it would have had no choice but to engage a third party 
to carry on production. The plaintiff in Freyberg had no similar restrictions 
on her legal capacity, but she had not had any significant involvement in 
business throughout her life and the Court found that she could not have 
operated the well by herself. Once the original lease was terminated she, 
like Montreal Trust, would have been required to enter a new lease 
arrangement with a different operator. In the Courts’ view, neither plaintiff 
would ever have been in the position to earn the net proceeds of production 
and would thus have received a windfall from an award based in restitution. 
In contrast, an award based on tort principles fully compensated the 
plaintiffs by examining the bonus and royalty arrangements that they would 
have been able to negotiate at the time the lease terminated. In Freyberg, 
the Court found in principle that the plaintiff would have received a bonus 
payment and royalty rate significantly higher than the industry norm 
because the existence of a proven well meant that the lessee would not have 
to bear the normal risk of drilling a well that might have been 
unsuccessful.53 In Williston Wildcatters, the Court had sufficient evidence 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Ibid at para 99. 
 52. Ibid at para 100; Williston Wildcatters (Remedies), supra note 41 at paras 110–11. 
 53. Freyberg (Remedies), ibid at para 141. The Court required further evidence to 
establish the plaintiff’s actual loss, but the case was subsequently settled. See Chris Simard, 
David Holub & Larina Taylor, “Lady Freyberg: Examples of How Contemporary Courts in 
Alberta Approach the Modern Business Realities of the Freehold Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Lease” (2009) 46:2 Alta L Rev 299. 
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to quantify the damages. It concluded that, when the original lease 
terminated, the lessor would have been able to obtain a bonus of $6,400 for 
signing a new lease and a royalty rate of 18 percent, rather than the 12.5 
percent stipulated in the original lease.54 
Both decisions raised novel points in oil and gas law in Canada. They 
can best be understood by examining their historical sources and their 
impact on future decisions. 
B. Historical Antecedents 
Although none of the earlier cases in Canadian oil and gas law had 
explicitly taken a compensatory approach to calculating the loss suffered by 
the lessor, it is important to note that Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg 
did not come as bolts from the blue. Both cases relied on an established 
common law line of authority in mining law, and in particular, on the well-
known decision in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co.55 Livingstone had 
purchased approximately 1.5 acres of land, on which 30 miners’ cottages 
were located, in the middle of a coalfield leased to the respondents. Both 
Livingstone and the vendors thought that he had purchased only the surface 
of the land and that the vendors had reserved the property in all the coal 
beneath the surface. Acting on this belief, the respondents, in the course of 
extracting coal from the surrounding lands, also removed 5,895 tons of coal 
from beneath Livingstone’s 1.5 acre parcel. They acted in “perfect 
ignorance” and with “no bad faith, nor sinister intention”56 in removing the 
coal from Livingstone’s land. When the mining operations were completed 
and all the coal had been sold, Livingstone discovered that the original 
conveyance had inadvertently transferred to him the property in the coal 
beneath his land. 
Livingstone sought the value of all the coal removed from his land, with 
an allowance for the costs incurred by the respondents in bringing the coal 
to the surface. This formula would have yielded approximately £515. 
However, there were two obstacles to this claim. First, Livingstone could 
not have mined the coal profitably on his own because of the very small 
parcel of land which he owned. The only practical method by which he 
could have obtained value for the coal was by arranging for the respondents 
to remove his coal in the course of their own operations. Second, his own 
witnesses stated that they would have advised him to sell his coal subject to 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Williston Wildcatters, supra note 11 at para 49, aff’d Williston Wildcatters 
(Remedies), supra note 41 at paras 17, 112–15. 
 55. (1880) 5 AC 25 (HL (Scot)) [Livingstone]. 
 56. Ibid at 26. 
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a royalty that would yield approximately £171 and to recover the cost of 
repairing damages to his houses caused by subsidence from the mining 
operations. On this basis, the House of Lords affirmed the award of £200 
damages to Livingstone.57  
Livingstone provides a direct link in the lineage of the recent cases in 
Western Canada. The insistence by the House of Lords on calculating 
Livingstone’s loss on a compensatory measure where he could not 
economically or practically have developed the coal on his own explains 
the adoption of the same approach where the Courts found that the lessees 
did not have the legal capacity, in Williston Wildcatters, or the business 
acumen, in Freyberg, to exploit their own resources. The cases have thus 
undoubtedly established in Canada an alternative analysis of remedies in 
the case of a terminated lease. The following section will examine the 
impact of the alternative analysis in two subsequent decisions. 
C. The Extension of the Compensatory Approach 
The adoption of a compensatory approach to damages by the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal was bound to have an effect on subsequent 
oil and gas litigation. The extent of the potential impact of the difference 
between the compensatory and the restitutionary approaches was illustrated 
almost immediately in a complex case of trespass that arose from Alberta’s 
practice of allocating petroleum and natural gas rights in limited geological 
strata. In Xerex Exploration Ltd v Petro-Canada,58 the Crown had granted 
the shallow petroleum and natural gas rights to the base of the Bluesky-
Bullhead formations to the appellant. Xerex Exploration Ltd (Xerex) held 
the deep rights beneath those formations. The appellant obtained a licence 
to drill the 1-1 Well in order to explore its rights and the regulator permitted 
it to continue to drill a further 15 metres below the base of the Bluesky-
Bullhead formations. This extension, known as the “over-hole,” was 
granted for the sole purpose of accommodating the appellant’s logging tools 
and casing.59 When the appellant drilled the over-hole, it penetrated the 
deep zone, where Xerex held the mineral rights. Despite the limited 
purposes of the permission to drill the extension of the well, the appellant 
took the opportunity of taking drill cutting samples at one metre intervals in 
the over-hole. The samples showed promising signs of the presence of oil in 
the deep zone. 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Ibid at 32–33. 
 58. Supra note 30. 
 59. Ibid at para 15. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
500 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
The appellant immediately began negotiations to acquire the rights to the 
deep zone from Xerex. During the negotiations, Xerex asked whether the 
appellant had drilled into the deep zone. The appellant fraudulently 
misrepresented that it had not done so and failed to disclose that it had 
drilled a further seven metres into the deep zone and taken more samples in 
the days following the beginning of negotiations. As a result of the 
negotiations, in November 1996, Xerex sold its rights to the deep zone in 
exchange for a gross overriding royalty of 3 percent on any production 
obtained by the appellant.60 
About 18 months after acquiring Xerex’s rights to the deep zone, the 
appellant sold a number of properties, including the 1-1 Well, to another 
company for the price of approximately $1.4 million.61 In the spring of 
1999, Xerex learned by chance that the 1-1 Well had proved to be very 
productive. The discovery was particularly surprising, as Xerex had not 
received any royalties from the production, and it commenced proceedings 
against both the appellant and the new owner of the 1-1 Well. By the time 
of the trial, the net revenue for the 1-1 Well exceeded $3.5 million and its 
future net cash flow was estimated at almost $12.7 million.62 
Two facts in particular militated against Xerex recovering the proceeds 
of the production from its deep rights in this case. Although Xerex was an 
oil company, it was far from certain that it would have been able to exploit 
its deep rights in the absence of the appellant’s intervention. When the 
appellant began negotiations to acquire the rights to the deep zone, Xerex’s 
rights were due to expire unless it fulfilled the demanding requirement of 
drilling a potentially productive well within 20 days. Second, in hindsight, 
the appellant had made a bad decision in selling the very valuable 1-1 Well 
and other properties for $ 1.4 million. The difference between the selling 
price of the entire group of properties and the value of the ultimate 
production of the 1-1 Well meant that a remedy based on the extent by 
which the appellant had been enriched by its wrongdoing was much less 
attractive than a compensatory remedy. As a result, Xerex sought damages 
to place the company in the position it would have occupied if it had been 
properly informed of the appellant’s drilling activities in the deep zone. The 
Alberta Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial judge that, in the 
absence of the appellant’s misrepresentation and failure to disclose the 
extent of its drilling into the deep zone, Xerex would have negotiated a 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Ibid at paras 24–25. 
 61. Ibid at para 29. 
 62. Ibid at para 33. 
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farm-out agreement entitling it to 50 percent of the net profits of the 1-1 
Well, which were quantified at more than $8.1 million.63 
It is necessary to make only a slight change to the facts of this case in 
order to demonstrate the potentially dramatic difference between the 
compensatory and restitutionary approaches. If the appellant had retained 
ownership of the 1-1 Well and had contacted Xerex further in advance of 
the termination of its rights, so that Xerex might have been able to drill its 
own well in the deep zone, an interesting array of possibilities would have 
arisen. The appellant’s conduct would almost certainly have been classified 
as a bad faith trespass, and thus Xerex would have recovered all of the 
proceeds of production (under the American approach) or the proceeds of 
production minus the costs of transporting the oil to market (as suggested in 
Williston Wildcatters). Even if the appellant’s trespass had been classified 
as innocent, Xerex would presumably have been able to show that it could 
have produced oil from the deep rights on its own and recovered the net 
proceeds of production in the amount of $16.26 million.64 
A more traditional approach was adopted at the Canpar Holdings trial. 
As indicated in Part I.F of this article, the trial judge found that a gas lease 
had terminated through the lessee’s wrongful calculation of royalties and 
failure to respond to a subsequent notice of default. The Court then 
addressed the problem of fashioning the appropriate remedy for the gas that 
the lessee had produced after the date of termination. It noted that the Court 
in Freyberg had adopted the compensatory principle for the award of 
damages and that, in the present case, the lessee’s conduct was “far less 
egregious”65 than that of the defendant in Freyberg. This comment might 
suggest an inclination to award a remedy which was at least as mild as that 
awarded in Freyberg, but the Court then granted the lessor a remedy based 
on the proceeds of production after the termination of the lease, minus 
transportation costs. There was no explanation for this result in the original 
oral judgment, although in clarifying the reasons, the trial judge noted that 
the lessors could have produced from the wells themselves, thus 
distinguishing the actual calculation of damages from Freyberg.66 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Ibid at para 94. 
 64. The trial judge in the Xerex decision found that the past and future net profit from 
the 1-1 Well was $ 16,266,000, ibid. The Court of Appeal decision suggested an alternative 
avenue to this result by finding that the appellant was in a fiduciary relationship with Xerex, 
thus rendering the appellant liable to account to Xerex for its profit. See Maddaugh & 
McCamus, supra note 18 at 828–29. 
 65. Canpar Holdings trial, supra note 14 at 7. 
 66. Ibid at 8. 
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The Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision to relieve against the forfeiture 
of the gas lease avoided the necessity of discussing the applicable principles 
of damages, although the Court did note that the trial decision had created a 
windfall by requiring the lessee to pay both the net proceeds of production 
and the royalty at the rate prescribed in the lease.67 
The facts of the Xerex case seem to illustrate the potentially large 
differences that can occur under the so-called restitutionary approach and 
the compensatory approach adopted in Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg. 
The award of damages at trial in Canpar Holdings suggests that there is a 
degree of confusion in the application of the new approach. The following 
section will attempt to disentangle the conflicting principles that are now 
found in Canadian case law. 
IV. A Principled Approach to Overlapping Remedies 
A. Criticism of the New Approach 
The new approach to the question of compensation upon the unexpected 
termination of a lease drew severe criticism from distinguished authors. 
Both John Ballem and Nigel Bankes delivered strong attacks on the 
decisions on the basis of four major objections, each of which will be 
considered in turn. 
1. Inconsistency with Other Authorities in Natural Resources Law 
Perhaps the primary critique of the new approach articulated in Williston 
Wildcatters and Freyberg is that it represents a significant departure from 
the way that the courts have determined a proper remedy in cases that 
involve the wrongful severance of natural resources. Bankes argues that the 
vast majority of such cases are restitutionary in nature and that the 
corresponding remedies are best understood as falling within one of three 
categories: (1) allowing the lessee no deductions for the costs associated 
with severance; (2) allowing the lessee to deduct post-severance costs only; 
and (3) allowing the lessee to deduct pre- and post-severance costs.68 
In analyzing the compensatory approach that was taken in Williston 
Wildcatters and Freyberg, which Professor Bankes refers to as the “costs-
plus approach,” he suggests that the House of Lords in Livingstone69 did not 
intend to develop a mild compensatory rule of broad application in the way 
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that the recent cases suggest.70 Rather, the Court emphasized that the facts 
in Livingstone were peculiar (that is, well outside of the norm) and gave rise 
to a compensatory measure of damages on the particular facts of the case. 
Bankes quotes Lord Blackburn who stated in Livingstone: 
My Lords, I wish only to say one word to guard against any 
misapprehension on a point which I at first a little 
misapprehended. I do not think that this decision of the Court of 
Session is that the royalty is the measure of damages. It is only 
that it is evidence of the value which is the measure of the 
damages.71 
Bankes thus argues that the bulk of the authority on wrongful severance 
supports a restitutionary approach and that the compensatory approach that 
has been so prominent in recent Canadian cases was meant to be narrowly 
confined. 
2. Failure to Ensure that Tortfeasors Should Not Profit from their 
Wrongs 
Although the general approach to damages in tort is based upon the 
compensation principle and is designed to restore the plaintiff to the 
position it would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred, a competing 
principle in the context of wrongful severance of natural resources is that 
tortfeasors should not benefit from their wrongs.72 The decision in AG v 
Blake73 is particularly informative in this regard. Blake, though concerned 
with a breach of contract, provided an important caveat to the standard 
compensatory approach when Lord Nicholls stated: 
Damages are measured by the plaintiffs loss, not the defendant’s 
gain. But the common law, pragmatic as ever, has long 
recognised that there are many commonplace situations where a 
strict application this principle would not do justice between the 
parties. Then compensation for the wrong done to the plaintiff is 
measured by a different yardstick. A trespasser who enters 
another’s land may cause the landowner no financial loss. In 
such a case damages are measured by the benefit received by the 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Bankes, “Termination,” supra note 19 at 68–69. 
 71. Ibid at 69, citing Livingstone, supra note 55 at 42–43 [emphasis in Bankes, 
“Termination”]. 
 72. Ibid at 75. 
 73. [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL (Eng)) [Blake]. 
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trespasser, namely, by his use of the land. The same principle is 
applied where the wrong consists of use of another’s land for 
depositing waste, or by using a path across the land or using 
passages in an underground mine. In this type of case the 
damages recoverable will be, in short, the price a reasonable 
person would pay for the right of user. 
. . . 
In some instances the common law itself afforded a wronged 
party a choice of remedies. A notable example is the wrong of 
conversion. A person whose goods were wrongfully converted 
by another had a choice of two remedies against the wrongdoer. 
He could recover damages, in respect of the loss he had 
sustained by the conversion. Or he could recover the proceeds of 
the conversion obtained by the defendant.74 
In effect it is argued that the compensatory approach fails to give 
sufficient weight to a significant body of authority that allows for a plaintiff 
to make a restitutionary or gains-based claim so as to prevent the tortfeasor 
from profiting from its wrong. 
3. Failure to Respect the Property Rights of the Lessor 
A third line of criticism argues that the compensatory approach 
diminishes the protection provided to the property rights of the lessor. In 
determining whether to apply the restitutionary or the compensatory 
approach, the courts must inquire into whether the lessor could or would 
have produced the mineral estate on its own. The late John Ballem noted 
that this “requires the court to delve into the affairs of the plaintiff, a task 
for which it is ill-equipped.”75 
The argument continues that the distinction invariably results in some 
lessors being more “equal” than others. In cases involving continued 
production after a lease has failed, lessors who are sophisticated 
commercial oil and gas producers are more likely to receive significant 
damages than individual lessors who are unable to demonstrate that they 
could have produced their minerals on their own.76 
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4. Lack of Incentive to Discontinue Production Under a Challenged 
Lease 
As illustrated in Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg, the compensatory 
approach can result in the wrongdoer paying damages in the form of a 
bonus payment and an increased royalty rate. This creates the risk that an 
overholding lessee may look at the minor potential financial consequences 
of continuing to produce and decide, from a business perspective, that it is 
worth the risk. As Ballem pointed out: 
If the bonus consideration and the royalty rate happened to be 
the same as were commonly obtained at the time the lease 
terminated, it would appear that the mineral owner would not be 
entitled to any compensation whatsoever. This despite the fact 
that the lessee had enjoyed revenue from the production of 
minerals to which it had no legal title.77 
This could tempt the overholding lessee to continue in possession of the 
leased lands and obtain production revenues while participating in a 
protracted legal battle over the validity of the underlying lease, especially 
if, as recent case law suggests, this conduct would not be seen as acting in 
bad faith but merely an example of a lessee acting upon its view of its legal 
rights.78 
The likelihood that there will be more decisions on the impact of 
unexpectedly terminated leases requires an analysis of the extent to which 
these criticisms are justified and an examination of whether the gulf 
between the compensatory and restitutionary approaches is as great as the 
authors suggest. From the viewpoint of principle and certainty, the accounts 
of the evolution of the compensatory principle in Canada creates two major 
issues, which will be considered in turn. 
B. When is a Restitutionary Remedy Available? 
The first issue occurs as a result of the approach to the problems that 
arise when the plaintiff has a choice of overlapping remedies, each of which 
may create a different measure of damages. In Williston Wildcatters, the 
lessor disputed the trial judge’s damage assessment based on compensation 
instead of restitution and claimed the full value of its minerals, less the 
costs of production and marketing, in order to prevent the original lessee 
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from profiting from its wrongdoing.79 The Court appeared to reject the 
restitutionary approach and applied the compensatory principle which, in its 
view, “derives from equity and has as its goal doing justice and equity 
between all the parties on the facts.”80 The Court in Freyberg saw a stark 
choice between the two approaches and firmly applied the compensatory 
principle of tort law in order to avoid conferring a windfall on the lessor. In 
essence both Courts rejected the lessor’s claim in restitution because they 
felt that its result would be excessively generous and that it should be 
ignored on the grounds of justice and equity. 
The denial of the restitutionary remedy on these grounds is both 
alarming and contrary to the normal approach when overlapping remedies 
are available in a particular case. In essence, it treats restitution as a guide 
to the quantification of damages, rather than an independent cause of 
action. In principle, plaintiffs who establish the elements of an action in 
unjust enrichment are entitled to a restitutionary remedy and the courts have 
no business in substituting a tort remedy on the grounds that it seems fairer. 
As Justice La Forest stated: 
[A] claim for an unjust enrichment, is concerned with giving 
back to someone something that has been taken from them (a 
restitutionary proprietary award) or its equivalent value (a 
personal restitutionary award) . . . [the function] “is to ensure 
that where a plaintiff has been deprived of wealth that is either in 
his possession or would have accrued for his benefit, it is 
restored to him. The measure of restitutionary recovery is the 
gain the [defendant] made at the [plaintiffs] expense.’’81 
The claims of the lessors in both Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg 
have a firm historical foundation in an area of restitution that was formerly 
(and misleadingly) known as “waiver of tort.” The underlying principle of 
the cases in this area was that the plaintiff gave up the right to sue in tort 
and instead elected “to base the claim in restitution, thereby seeking to 
recoup the benefits that the defendant has derived from the tortious 
conduct.”82 Indeed, conversion and trespass provide some of the most 
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familiar examples of recovery under this heading.83 They are now 
understood as examples of restitution for wrongdoing84 and reflect the 
general principle that a defendant may be required to restore the value of a 
benefit that was gained not just from a tort, but from any type of 
wrongdoing. The action is initially triggered by the occurrence of a wrong, 
although its purpose is to prevent the defendant from being unjustly 
enriched through wrongdoing. 
In cases such as Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg, the plaintiffs 
fulfilled the requirements of actions in both tort and restitution. A broadly 
analogous problem arose in a series of Canadian cases in which the courts 
confronted cases where the defendant’s conduct created both a breach of 
contract and a tort. At first, the courts had difficulty with the existence of 
overlapping remedies, each of which were subject to different rules and 
measures of damages. Famously, Justice Pigeon once proclaimed in the 
Supreme Court of Canada that “the basis of tort liability considered in 
Hedley Byrne is inapplicable to any case where the relationship between the 
parties is governed by a contract, unless the negligence relied on can 
properly be considered as an ‘independent tort’ unconnected with the 
performance of that contract.”85 It took more than a decade for the courts to 
recognize that the same set of facts could create concurrent liability in 
contract and tort, unless a contractual provision excluded or limited the tort 
action. The general principle allowed the plaintiff “to assert the cause of 
action that appears to be most advantageous to him in respect of any 
particular legal consequence.”86 
There can surely be no argument that prevents this principle from 
applying where the same set of facts fulfills the requirements of an action in 
tort and an action in restitution. The plaintiff must be able to assert the most 
advantageous cause of action available in the particular case and a court 
cannot rule out either action on the flimsy ground that its result may be 
unjust or inequitable. Any suggestion to that effect in Williston Wildcatters 
or Freyberg must be wrong. In the view of the authors, it is correct to say 
that the plaintiff may choose to pursue a remedy in restitution when the 
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elements of that action are fulfilled, even where the underlying facts also 
create liability in tort. However, this conclusion does not end the matter. An 
examination of the modern law of restitution suggests that in both cases the 
Courts were justified in their concern over awarding the net proceeds of 
production to the plaintiff. It is quite possible that those courts achieved the 
right result, but for the wrong reasons. 
C. The Measure of Recovery in Restitution 
Although the critiques of Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg provide a 
great deal of valuable analysis, they go a step too far in arguing that the 
normal consequence of applying the restitutionary approach involves the 
recovery of some measure of the proceeds of production. The same can be 
said of a statement to the same effect made in an earlier article by one of the 
present authors.87 Recent Canadian decisions also assumed that an award in 
restitution would produce this result. It is true that the American cases on 
good faith trespass, as well as (in the writers’ view) the Sohio decision, 
suggest that the innocent trespasser must pay to the lessor the net proceeds 
of production after the termination of the lease. However, the understanding 
of restitution has developed rapidly over the last quarter century and it is 
important to examine whether these assumptions remain valid. It is often 
the case that when principles from private law are adopted into oil and gas 
law, they are perpetuated in subsequent oil and gas cases with little 
reference to developments in their original context.88 As a result, while it is 
true cases such as Williston Wildcatters that adopt the compensatory royalty 
approach “are inconsistent with the bulk of authority” in natural resource 
severance cases,89 it is important to examine whether the bulk of authority 
continues to represent the modern law of restitution. 
There are two methods of awarding damages based on the gain made by 
the defendant as a result of a wrong. Restitutionary damages are designed to 
reverse a wrongful transfer value from the plaintiff to the defendant. James 
Edelman provides an example that is similar in principle to some of the 
cases involving oil and gas leases. Following the expiry of a lease, the 
tenant wrongfully remained on the landlord’s premises, thus committing 
trespass to land. The value wrongfully transferred to the tenant took the 
form of the use of the landlord’s premises. The restitutionary damages for 
the wrong committed by the tenant were measured by the fair market value 
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for the wrongful use of the premises gained by the tenant.90 The function of 
the award of restitutionary damages in this case was not to compensate for 
the loss suffered by the landlord, but to reverse the transfer of wealth from 
the landlord by subtracting the objective benefit received by the tenant as a 
result of the wrong it had committed. In quantifying damages, it did not 
matter whether the tenant had made a spectacular profit or incurred a loss as 
a result of the occupation of the landlord’s premises. In the words of Lord 
Nicholls in Blake, the damages were based on “the price a reasonable 
person would pay for the right of user.”91 
In contrast to restitutionary damages, the defendant’s gain can also be 
stripped by disgorgement damages, which require the surrender of the 
profits resulting from the wrong. In the entire field of civil remedies, 
disgorgement is an unusual remedy. Unless a case can be made for 
exemplary damages, it is rare for any award to strip profits from the 
defendant, particularly where a breach of duty is not wilful. It is equally 
rare in unjust enrichment. It is simply not the case as a general principle 
that a tortfeasor or other wrongdoer is never permitted to profit from a 
wrong. In the language of the American Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
& Unjust Enrichment, disgorgement is found in some cases involving a 
“calculating” or a “conscious” wrongdoer,92 as in the case of a bad faith 
trespass or one who knowingly publishes a libellous book.93 In Blake, the 
Court awarded disgorgement in the case of deliberate, criminal breaches of 
contract and a failure to comply with an undertaking that was akin to a 
fiduciary obligation.94 
In Canada, a well-known example of disgorgement occurred in Lac 
Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd,95 in which Lac 
Minerals Ltd (Lac Minerals) cynically, and in breach of confidence, used 
information obtained during negotiations with International Corona 
Resources Ltd to acquire and make large profits from land containing a rich 
gold deposit. In this case, the unique nature of the land persuaded the Court 
to make a proprietary award, by requiring Lac Minerals to disgorge the 
property itself, through the device of the remedial constructive trust. 
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Disgorgement damages are also awarded to protect certain institutions by 
removing the prospect of gain from even innocent wrongdoing. This 
explains the use of disgorgement in cases of breach of fiduciary duty, where 
the courts are vitally concerned to hold fiduciaries to the duties they have 
assumed. As the Supreme Court of Canada recently noted, “disgorgement is 
imposed to serve a prophylactic purpose, the relevant causation is the 
breach of a fiduciary duty and the defendant’s gain (not the plaintiff’s loss). 
Denying [the wrongdoer] profit generated by the financial interest that 
constituted his conflict teaches faithless fiduciaries that conflicts of interest 
do not pay.”96 
Where a court awards the lessor the net proceeds of production upon the 
termination of the lease, it is in essence requiring disgorgement, in the form 
of stripping the profits of tortious production from the lessee. Yet it is 
impossible to describe the lessee in most of the Canadian cases as a 
“conscious” or “calculating” or even as a deliberate wrongdoer. The lessee 
is subject to the normal measure of damages in the law of torts and the 
lessor may well have a restitutionary remedy, but neither of these 
approaches is likely to result in disgorgement. The underlying principle of 
damage awards throughout private law is designed to ensure that the 
plaintiffs are compensated for losses that they have suffered. Those who fail 
to respect property rights must pay the losses of the owner, unless their 
conduct is so egregious as to attract punitive damages. 
It is true that a claim for restitution for wrongdoing changes the focus of 
inquiry from the loss suffered by the lessor to the enrichment obtained by 
the lessee as a result of its wrongdoing. The normal remedy in the case of 
restitution for wrongdoing, in the absence of conscious wrongdoing or the 
need to protect vital institutions such as fiduciary relationships, focuses on 
what the lessee gained from the wrongful occupation of the leased lands. In 
the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, the function of a restitutionary 
remedy is to give back to someone “something that has been taken from 
them . . . or its equivalent value”97 or, more simply put, restitution refers to 
“the reversal of a transfer of value from a claimant to a defendant.”98 
The application of this principle to terminated leases must involve an 
examination of the value transferred from the lessor to the lessee when the 
lease came to an end. At that time, the plaintiff lessor “has clearly been 
deprived, as a result of the defendant’s wrongdoing, of the opportunity to 
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rent the property to the defendant [or to another company] for the plaintiff’s 
purposes at a fair return.”99 In the cases considered in this article, because a 
commercial well now exists on land owned by the lessor, the benefit or 
value transferred to the lessee should be measured by the return that the 
lessor would have been able to command by entering into a new lease with 
either the defendant or another lessee. This approach suggests that the 
courts may have been on the right track in Williston Wildcatters and 
Freyberg when they enquired into the bonus and royalty rate that would 
have been payable at the time the lease was terminated. However, this result 
would not occur because the principles of justice and equity somehow 
deprived the lessor of seeking a restitutionary remedy. The appeal to those 
principles suggests that the assessment of damages is discretionary, rather 
than guided by well-established principles. In fact, the results in these cases 
are entirely consistent with an award of restitution. 
The question then arises of the quantification of an award of damages 
when, as sometimes occurs in the petroleum industry,100 the lessor is 
capable of producing the land itself or perhaps arranging production 
through a contract operator. Both Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg 
recognized, at least by implication, that the lessor might have a successful 
claim for the net proceeds of production in this situation. However, perhaps 
contrary to suggestions in those cases, this result would occur as a result of 
compensatory damages in the law of torts rather than as an award of 
restitutionary damages for tortious wrongdoing. An award in restitution 
would still be measured by the return that the lessor would have been able 
to obtain at the time the original lease terminated. However, the lessor has a 
strong argument that an award of the net proceeds of production would be 
required to place it in the position it would have occupied if the tort had not 
occurred. 
This conclusion suggests that there might be a divergence between 
Canadian and American oil and gas law on the effect of an unexpectedly 
terminated lease. However, the American case law is not entirely 
consistent. Although many decisions continue to award the net proceeds of 
production in the case of terminated leases, others suggest that the 
appropriate measure of damages for unofficious trespass is compensatory 
and should be based on the award of an appropriate royalty to the lessor. In 
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Beck v Northern Natural Gas Company,101 the gas company was 
commissioned by state and federal authorities to store gas in the Viola 
formation, where it held the storage rights. However, the gas company was 
able to store a much greater amount of gas than originally contemplated 
because the gas had migrated to a lower formation in which it did not hold 
the storage rights. The case posed a classic conflict, because the fair rental 
value of storage in the lower formation was $2.3 million, but the gas 
company was able to generate additional profits of $12 million as a result of 
inadvertently using the additional storage space without authorization. The 
claimants had originally been awarded damages based on the reasonable 
rental rate for the lower formation, but appealed on the basis that they were 
entitled to an award of the profits that arose from the gas company’s 
trespass. Their case for additional damages was dismissed because a 
remedy based in an unjust enrichment did not justify profit stripping. The 
purpose of profit stripping was not to reverse a transferred enrichment, but 
to act as a deterrent in the case of bad faith trespass. 
The American Restatement also reflects the approach of the Beck case 
and recent Canadian decisions. Section 40 of the American Restatement 
recognizes that the person who obtains a benefit by an act of trespass or 
conversion is liable in restitution to the victim of the wrong.102 The 
commentary on the relevant article of the American Restatement states that 
the conscious wrongdoer will be stripped of gains that result from 
unauthorized interference with another’s property. However, the 
restitutionary liability of the defendant without fault will not exceed the 
value obtained in the transaction for which liability is imposed. As a result, 
innocent trespassers and converters are liable in restitution for the value of 
what they have gained, usually measured by the cost of a licence 
(representing the fair value of obtaining access to the lands), but not for 
consequential gains. These principles are expanded in Section 51, where the 
remedy of eliminating profit from wrongdoing through disgorgement is 
specifically restricted to the case of the conscious wrongdoer. In the case of 
other wrongdoers, the commentary to Section 51 adds: 
So long as benefits wrongfully obtained have an ascertainable 
market value, that value is the minimum measure of the 
wrongdoing defendant’s unjust enrichment, even if the 
transaction produces no ascertainable injury to the claimant and 
no ascertainable benefit to the defendant. Reasonable rental 
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value or a reasonable royalty will often supply such a 
measure.103 
The provisions of the new draft American Restatement are thus 
consistent with recent Canadian case law. Restitutionary remedies are 
clearly available in the case of innocent wrongdoing, but they focus on 
reversing the value transferred from the plaintiff to the wrongdoer rather 
than forcing the wrongdoer to disgorge its profits. The earlier American 
cases and their Canadian counterparts, which award the net proceeds of 
production to the lessor in cases of good faith trespass, are anomalous and, 
as Canadian courts have suggested, should not be followed. 
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